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PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE USE OF UI BY WELFARE LEAVERS
Among women who received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and then left the program for employment, Kaye (1997) estimates that about 13 percent of those leaving AFDC would draw a UI benefit, while about 35 percent would accumulate sufficient earnings and work experience to qualify for UI. Gustafson and Levine (1997) examine leavers from AFDC using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and estimate the proportion satisfying simulated UI monetary eligibility in data spanning 1979 to 1994 (Table 1) . Among those leaving welfare, Gustafson and Levine estimate that 70-85 percent would meet or exceed the monetary eligibility requirements for UI and about 25 percent of women with job separations would satisfy nonmonetary eligibility requirements for UI. Since only a small proportion of UI eligible jobless actually draw UI compensation, Gustafson and Levine estimate that about 10 percent of AFDC leavers would get UI benefits. They assert that the provision mandating that separations be "involuntary" would prevent most workers from gaining UI eligibility and conjectured that the UI system will provide little additional support to the safety net following welfare reform. Vroman (1998) examines average earnings rates and UI eligibility requirements across states at the time TANF was implemented. He reports that about 35 percent of all jobless persons receive UI benefits with that rate higher at the beginning of recessions and in states with weaker eligibility criteria. He speculates that compared to others in the workforce, TANF leavers are likely to have higher jobless rates, lower wage rates, higher rates of voluntary quits and discharges, and lower availability for full-time work. Vroman infers that among jobless TANF leavers, only about 20 percent will qualify for UI benefits. He warned that UI is not likely to evolve in ways that broaden eligibility for TANF leavers and that UI is "likely to play a very limited support role for TANF leavers" (Vroman, p. 5) . Holzer (2000) examines earnings and employment of TANF leavers in the years immediately following implementation of TANF. Based on his survey of 3,000 employers in four large American cities between 1997 and 1999, he asserts that more claimants would qualify monetarily for UI than in earlier years. Nonetheless, Holzer warns that several remaining barriers 3 to UI eligibility could be significant. These include job separations due to voluntary quits and dismissals for cause, lack of availability for full-time work, and employment in informal jobs or others not covered by UI. Kaye (2001) rather those at risk of welfare receipt. She estimates that 81 percent of at-risk workers would meet the UI monetary eligibility requirements in 1998. Among these, Kaye estimates that less than three-quarters had a qualifying job separation, 40 percent were not available for full-time work, and 64 percent were unlikely to be both available and actively seeking work. The net result is a beneficiary rate of about 25 percent among likely UI applicants. Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto, and Corson (2002) while between 50 and 80 percent would qualify in any quarter during the two-year period. The rate of potential monetary eligibility was estimated to increase with the length of time from TANF exit to first jobless experience. Rates of expected monetary eligibility were not sensitive to changes in program eligibility rules. Changes examined included adjustments to consider more recent earnings when determining benefit eligibility and relaxing rules requiring availability for full-time work.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE USE OF ES BY WELFARE LEAVERS
Before this study, there has not been research on the use of ES by TANF leavers in the United States. However, there has been recent research in Canada on the use of public employment services by leavers from social assistance. A Canadian field experiment found that financial incentives for leaving welfare alone did not result in significant reductions in dependency, but when combined with reemployment services the financial incentives yielded large and statistically significant reductions in rates of welfare receipt (Robins, Michalopolous, and Foley 2008) .
ELIGIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE BENEFITS
The introduction of TANF, with its lifetime limits and work requirements for continued receipt of cash assistance, meant that traditional employment and training programs would be key to self-sufficiency for TANF leavers. As background for the present research, I review UI and TANF eligibility rules in each of the four states analyzed.
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UI Eligibility
UI eligibility rules ensure that beneficiaries are strongly attached to the labor force and are temporarily jobless through no fault of their own. To initially qualify for UI, a claimant must have sufficient prior earnings and employment-these are called monetary eligibility conditions. Furthermore, the job separation must be involuntary. Nonmonetary eligibility rules prohibit quits and discharge for misconduct or other causes justifiable by an employer. Employer discharge for cause is usually related to frequent tardiness, unexplained absences, misconduct, or poor job performance. 3 UI applicants must also be able, available, and actively seeking full time work.
For initial and continuing eligibility, beneficiaries may not refuse an offer of suitable work.
Monetary eligibility for UI is determined by base period earnings. The UI base period is normally the first four of the previous five completed calendar quarters before the date of claim for benefits. 4 Table 2 lists the minimum base period earnings required to qualify for the minimum UI weekly benefit amount. For 2000, base period earnings requirements in the four states studied ranged from $1,872 in Georgia to $3,400 in Florida.
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Monetary qualification for UI in many states requires earnings in the high calendar quarter of the base period to be above a specified level. 6 Most states with a high-quarter earnings requirement also have an earnings dispersion requirement-all of the four states studied require earnings in at least two calendar quarters of the base period. Ohio is one of the few states in the nation with a base period employment requirement, and it is a very restrictive rule. 7 The Ohio weeks of employment rule limits eligibility to those with at least 20 weeks of work in which earnings average at least 27.5 percent of the state average weekly wage in covered employment ( separate from earnings requirements, and there has been little prior direct evidence on the job separation patterns for recent TANF leavers. The present study does not examine the sensitivity of UI eligibility to a more recent base period for earnings computation or relaxing the requirement that job-seeking be for full-time work. Prior research suggests modest impacts on UI eligibility for TANF leavers from such changes (Vroman 1998 ).
For those who qualify, UI pays benefits weekly; the cash amount increases with the level of prior earnings up to a state maximum. Table 2 lists the statewide average UI weekly benefit amounts. Also listed in Table 2 are average weekly wages of all workers covered by UI in calendar year 2000 in the states examined. This provides a sense of the average wage replacement rate provided by UI to regular full-time workers.
TANF Eligibility
Needy families with dependent children and earnings below the breakeven thresholds listed in Table 2 2) Job search assistance. Resume preparation help, job search workshops, job clubs, labor market information, and job search plans.
3) Assessment services. Job interview practice, employment counseling, and testing for job aptitudes and of job skills.
4) Training referrals. Referrals to federally or state-funded training for job skills or job search skills. Depending on available funding, some ES offices also offer supportive services for job search or training including temporary assistance with transportation or child care costs. Data available for analysis of ES use in this study are limited to Wagner-Peyserfunded services during specific time periods in Georgia and Ohio.
DATA FOR ANALYSIS
TANF exit and use of UI were studied with administrative data from Florida, Georgia, Michigan, and Ohio. Access to administrative data on UI and TANF for Florida and Ohio was provided through the ADARE consortium supported by the U.S. Department of Labor.
Additional data were provided by Georgia, Michigan, and Ohio directly to the Upjohn Institute under separate bilateral data sharing agreements.
The samples for analysis include those voluntarily leaving TANF for employment.
Samples exclude those who fail to receive a TANF cash payment because of a sanction or other involuntary reason. Because of the periodicity of some administrative data needed for the study, the time unit for analysis is the calendar quarter. Because of the uneven time periods for data available across the states, the sample time frames differ somewhat across the states. All were drawn from the time shortly after TANF was enacted in 1996. Key concepts in the analysis are as follows:
TANF exit for employment is defined as making zero cash TANF payment to the assistance unit in a calendar quarter and having earnings of at least $100 in that calendar quarter or the next quarter. The zero payment must not be due to a sanction.
Employment is defined as earnings of at least $100 in a calendar quarter. This definition is the same as that applied by the Social Security Administration when measuring the duration of insured employment to determine eligibility for retirement benefits.
Unemployment is defined as a calendar quarter with earnings of less than $100.
All three of these concepts are measured using UI administrative records on earnings as Each of these time frames permits observation of UI claims and possible return to TANF for at least 12 calendar quarters after TANF exit. The sample sizes for TANF leavers analyzed are listed in Table 3 . The four-state total sample size is 322,038. These data include adult grantees in TANF recipient households who left TANF for employment and represent a census of TANF leavers in the four states during the years included. Figure 1 ). The pooled data on newly jobless TANF leavers include a population that is 37 percent youth, 58 percent prime-age, 82 percent female, 36 percent white, 59 percent African American, and 4 percent Hispanic. Average quarterly earnings in the three years before TANF exit were $1,793, and average quarterly earnings from TANF exit to new joblessness were $2,239 (Appendix Table A .1).
The UI application rates ranged from 17.9 to 39.6 percent of newly jobless in the four states within three years after leaving TANF ( Table A .1).
UI ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT RECEIPT
The general rules for monetary and nonmonetary eligibility for UI benefits are summarized above. This section examines the rates of achieving these requirements in the samples examined in this study and the rate of UI benefit receipt.
UI Monetary Eligibility
Among TANF leavers who become newly jobless and apply for UI benefits, 87.2 percent were initially eligible for UI based on monetary requirements in the four-state pooled data (Table   3 , Figure 2 ). The rates of monetary eligibility range from 65.3 percent of the Ohio sample to 98.1 of the Michigan sample. The lower monetary eligibility rates in Ohio result from the strict requirement for 20 or more weeks of work with average earnings being at least 27.5 percent of the state average weekly wage in UI-covered employment.
UI Nonmonetary Eligibility
In addition to having sufficient levels of prior employment and earnings, applicants for UI must also have separated involuntarily from their previous jobs and must be currently able, available, and actively seeking work. In the sample of UI applicants pooled across four states, the rate of nonmonetary eligibility is 43.7 percent. Rates for individual states range from 31.5 percent in Ohio to 48.1 percent in Georgia (Table 3 , Figure 2 ). For TANF leavers, higher rates of voluntary job quits and justifiable dismissals result in lower rates of nonmonetary eligibility.
Receipt of UI Benefits
Among TANF leavers who are UI applicants, the proportions receiving UI benefits in the states examined range from 30.0 percent in Ohio to 64.8 percent in Michigan (Table 3 , Figure 2 ).
The overall mean rate of benefit receipt was 50.3 percent in the sample pooled across four states.
Among TANF leavers who qualify for UI, mean weekly benefit amounts are $159, mean entitled durations of UI benefits are 19.6 weeks, and on average 74.6 percent of entitled UI benefits are drawn (Table 4) . Mean UI payments are $2,442 over the full benefit year, or a mean of 14.5 Monetarily-eligible rate Nonmonetarily-eligible rate UI beneficiary rate weeks of UI at the average weekly benefit amount for this sample. Benefit entitlements are fully exhausted by 53.2 percent of TANF-leaver UI beneficiaries. 
TANF LEAVERS' UI USE COMPARED TO OTHERS
Comparing TANF leavers to those not recently involved with TANF in the combined sample pooled across all four states, simple differences between the two groups reveal lower rates of monetary eligibility, nonmonetary eligibility, and benefit receipt for TANF leavers compared to all other UI applicants in the same time periods ( b In Michigan and Ohio, the number of persons with nonzero UI compensation received in the benefit year is greater than the number of persons for whom we observe nonzero weekly benefit amount (WBA) or maximum benefits payable. Because of this, the sample size for which full-time equivalent weeks and exhaustion are observed is 3,091 for Michigan and 3,218 for Ohio.
c Right-side variables in pooled models limited by characteristic data available for Ohio. The pooled model includes variables for the states, weekly benefit amount (WBA), WBA at maximum, base period earnings, employment history in the three years prior to UI filing and dummies for the year and quarter of UI filing. State-specific models for Florida, Georgia, and Michigan use a broader set of explanatory variables that differ between states.
UI AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY
A goal of UI as social insurance is to prevent descent into poverty by those who are temporarily jobless through no fault of their own (Blaustein 1990, pp. 44-46) . Among the newly jobless TANF leavers in the four-state pooled sample, 77.5 percent returned to employment, but 36.4 percent returned to TANF (Figure 3) . 11 Following is a correlation analysis of the influence of UI benefit receipt on returning to employment or TANF. Naturally, in a period after joblessness some TANF leaver UI applicants both worked and received additional TANF benefits.
To measure the correlation between UI benefit receipt and return to employment or TANF, linear probability models were estimated controlling for observable differences among UI applicants. Models for both binary outcomes have the same general form, including binary indicator control variables for monetary eligibility, nonmonetary eligibility, benefit receipt, and whether the entitlement is at the state maximum weekly benefit amount. The complete list of other UI program, demographic, and labor market control variables are listed in the notes to Table 7 , which presents results from estimation of models on the samples of TANF leaver UI applicants pooled across all four states. Controlling for observable characteristics, receipt of UI is estimated to increase return to employment by 4.8 percentage points and to reduce return to TANF by 10.5 percentage points compared to nonbeneficiary UI applicants.
12
11 Using data from all four states, we have 12 calendar quarters after TANF exit for employment to observe joblessness, UI application, and return to employment and/or TANF. Regression-adjusted results discussed below control for the variation across individuals in the time from TANF exit to joblessness.
12 O'Leary and Kline (2010) report on several attempts to correct for the endogeniety of UI benefit receipt as a predictor of employment and return to TANF. Various corrections did not significantly change impact estimates.
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To investigate whether UI receipt affects return to employment or TANF differently for those who exhaust their UI entitlement compared to beneficiaries who do not exhaust their entitlement, the single UI beneficiary binary variable was replaced by a pair of indicator variables, one for nonexhaustee beneficiaries and the other for exhaustees of their UI benefit entitlement. The results summarized in Table 7 suggest that the effect of UI benefit receipt on return to employment declines with the duration of benefit receipt. That is, among nonexhaustees UI receipt increases return to employment by 8.2 percentage points, whereas the effect for UI exhaustees is only 1.7 percentage points. The correlation between UI receipt and a reduced rate of return to TANF is greatly diminished for UI exhausters. In the sample pooled across the four states, UI receipt reduces return to TANF by 14 percentage points for nonexhaustees but by only 7.2 percentage points for exhausters of their UI entitlement. 
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The state-specific models of return to employment and TANF suggest that in our unweighted pooled regression models the large samples from Georgia dominate. The statespecific effect estimates for Georgia on both outcomes are not significantly different from the pooled estimate, and both parameter estimates for Florida are consistent with the pooled results having similar sign, magnitude, and significance. The strongest response to UI benefit receipt on both outcomes is seen for Ohio, the state where UI receipt requires the strongest demonstration of labor force attachment. Relative to the estimate for the pooled sample, Ohio UI recipients have nearly double the odds of becoming reemployed, and are 50 percent less likely to return to TANF. 13 Compared to the other three states, UI receipt in Michigan correlated with similar reductions in return to TANF, but the weaker results for reemployment in Michigan reflect the severe slack in labor markets during the period.
By interacting return to employment with return to TANF we get a much more informative view of how UI receipt is correlated with self-sufficiency-return to employment without return to TANF. In our sample of newly unemployed TANF leavers pooled across four states, 47.6 percent remain self-sufficient in the 12 calendar quarters after TANF exit. In this section we examine the correlation of UI receipt with all of the four possible combinations of employment and TANF receipt outcomes as summarized in the two-by-two matrix given as Figure 3 . In addition to the concept of self-sufficiency, we label employed with return to TANF as working poor (29.9 percent), no employment with return to TANF as TANF-dependent (6.5), and no employment with no return to TANF as inactive (16.0). The row totals in Figure 3 show the overall rate of returning to employment or not in the pooled four-state sample, while the column totals show the overall rates of returning to TANF or not. To measure the correlation between UI benefit receipt and the four measures of selfsufficiency controlling for observable differences, I estimated linear probability models on each of the four separate outcomes as summarized in Table 8 . Controlling for observable characteristics, compared to nonrecipient UI applicants, I estimate that UI beneficiaries are 12.0 percentage points more likely to be self-sufficient, 7.2 percentage points less likely to be working poor, 3.2 percentage points less likely to be TANF-dependent, and 1.5 percentage points less likely to be inactive.
Parameter estimates on covariates in Table 8 suggest that self-sufficiency (employment without TANF) is most likely among those who are of prime age for the labor market (aged 25-49), male, white, with employment in more quarters before UI application, those with multiple employers in at least one of their UI base period quarters, and those with recent prior employment in the industries of agriculture, manufacturing, and administrative support, and in areas where joblessness is lower. Results also suggest that the working poor (employment with TANF) are most likely younger workers (under 25), female, and African American; have more quarters of employment before UI application; have multiple employers in at least one UI base period quarter; are recently employed in the hospitality industry; and are located in areas with higher unemployment rates. Parameters in Table 8 suggest TANF dependency (TANF but no employment) is most likely among those aged 50 and over, female, with few quarters of employment before UI application, and those in high unemployment areas. Finally the results suggest that inactivity (neither employment nor TANF) is most likely for those aged 50 and over, male, not African American, those having fewer calendar quarters with earnings before UI application, having new joblessness longer after TANF exit, and those in low unemployment areas.
USE OF THE PUBLIC ES BY JOBLESS TANF LEAVERS
The public ES in the United States is funded through the Wagner-Peyser Act. One-stop career centers operating under the Workforce Investment Act deliver reemployment services divided into three increasing levels of service: core, intensive, and training. The core and intensive services at one-stops are commonly delivered by the ES with Wagner-Peyser funding.
Participants typically use core services before progressing to intensive or training services. The ES and UI systems are closely linked by the work test for continued UI benefit eligibility (O'Leary 2006) . The work test is administered by the ES. Using data from Georgia and Ohio, I examine the use of Wagner-Peyser-funded ES services by newly jobless TANF leavers and measure the correlations between ES services usage and labor market outcomes, controlling for the degree of UI involvement.
Evidence from these two states suggests that about one-quarter of newly jobless TANF leavers use public ES services. Among these, sizable numbers of UI nonapplicants use ES services, but usage rates are significantly higher among UI applicants. Importantly, ES services usage rates are similar between UI beneficiaries and nonbeneficiary UI applicants. This suggests that application for UI is a pathway to reemployment services provided by the ES even if cash UI benefits are not forthcoming. 26
Usage rates for any core or intensive service in Georgia are shown in Figure 4 , together with usage rates for the most popular core and intensive type services in Ohio. The figure shows that in Georgia 14 percent of UI nonapplicants receive at least one core ES service after new joblessness, while a core service was used by 78 percent of UI beneficiaries and 77 percent of UI-ineligible applicants. The core service called "job seeker match" in Ohio was used by 8 percent of UI nonapplicants, 45 percent of UI beneficiaries, and 48 percent of ineligible UI applicants. While usage rates are lower across the board for intensive services, a similar pattern of usage can be seen in both states across the UI usage groups (Figure 4) . A key contrast is the substantially higher rate of usage for both core and intensive services by ineligible UI applicants compared to UI nonapplicants.
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EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, RETURN TO EMPLOYMENT, AND TANF
For our samples of newly jobless TANF leavers in Georgia and Ohio, statistical analysis suggests that public ES services help to maintain connections with employment opportunities, particularly through job interview referrals for the working poor. This appears to be true regardless of the degree of involvement with UI. Also, despite the fact that UI applicants use ES services more often, this result still holds for UI nonapplicants. Additionally there is evidence that receipt of job interview referrals through the ES reduces rates of complete TANF dependency and inactivity.
Our measurement of correlations between service receipt and outcomes is affected by the time frames available for observation. Since core services are likely to be received earlier in a jobless spell than intensive services, there is a better chance to observe a positive outcome for core services. In particular, job interview referrals are most quickly dispensed, and their effects are more immediate than other services. Participation in intensive services happens only after exhausting more immediate reemployment opportunities offered by core services. Consequently there is less time to observe reemployment and earnings activity for intensive service recipients.
In regression models of ES services effects, the largest estimates are for the most popular core service: job referrals (Table 9 ). In Georgia, job referrals boost reemployment rates by 6.5, 4.9, and 10.7 percentage points, respectively, for UI nonapplicants, UI beneficiaries, and nonbeneficiary UI applicants. Job referrals impact estimates are also positive and significant on employment in Ohio for all three UI involvement groups. The point estimates are 5.7, 8.3, and 4.6 percentage points in increased employment rates, respectively, for UI nonapplicants, UI beneficiaries, and nonbeneficiary UI applicants. Statistical analysis also suggests a positive correlation between ES job referrals and return to TANF in both Georgia and Ohio. These results reflect the fact that many in these groups remain poor despite working. These people are struggling to maintain adequate income from multiple sources, which may often mean combining income from earnings and TANF. The parameter estimates suggest that the core ES job referrals may be particularly useful for the working poor. I find significant positive correlations between use of ES services and return to work among those who continue to rely on TANF.
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A uniformly favorable result following job referrals is a reduction in inactivity for all newly jobless TANF leavers. Inactivity means a lack of involvement with either employment or TANF. For Georgia, job referrals are measured as reducing inactivity by 4.8, 4.4, and 7.8 percentage points, respectively, for UI nonapplicants, UI beneficiaries, and nonbeneficiary UI applicants. For Ohio, estimates of the same effects were 4.7, 7.7, and 5.0 percentage points.
Among all effect estimates for job referrals, results are particularly encouraging for nonbeneficiary UI applicants. The largest positive effects on employment and self-sufficiency (employment without TANF) are measured for these newly jobless TANF leavers who use the ES at dramatically higher rates than UI nonapplicants.
Few of the intensive services in Georgia and Ohio are measured to have statistically significant effects on employment and return to TANF. The Georgia intensive service called "customer service plan" is similar to the Ohio service called "job search planning." Neither has a significant effect on employment or TANF for UI beneficiaries, but the respective programs measurably reduce return to TANF for UI nonapplicants in Ohio while modestly reducing the rate of return to employment for nonbeneficiary UI applicants in Georgia. The latter result may be due to the fact that customer service plans occur later in job search spells, permitting less time to observe return to employment in our restricted measurement period.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 changed welfare in the United States by establishing TANF. This law introduced lifetime limits on cash assistance and established work requirements for TANF cash benefits eligibility. These changes increased the importance of public employment and training programs for maintaining selfsufficiency after TANF exit. Key among these programs are UI, which provides temporary partial wage replacement to the involuntarily jobless, and the ES, which provides job matching and other reemployment services.
Using program data from the ADARE consortium, I examine the rates at which adults in households recently receiving TANF become jobless, apply for and receive UI benefits, and participate in publicly funded employment services. I also investigate the correlation between UI and employment services receipt with maintenance of self-sufficiency through return to work The data suggest that three-quarters of new TANF leavers experience joblessness within three years, and one-quarter of the newly jobless apply for UI benefits. About 87 percent of UI applicants have sufficient prior earnings to qualify for UI benefits; however, only about 44 percent qualify based on their job separation reasons. Among all UI applicants, TANF leavers were found to have much higher rates of voluntary quits and employer dismissals than non-TANF leavers. About half of newly jobless TANF leavers who apply for UI end up getting benefits. Among TANF leavers who become jobless and apply for and receive UI, the rate of return to employment is higher and the rate of return to TANF is lower for those who receive UI benefits. These patterns of UI and self-sufficiency are strongest in Ohio, which has the highest prior work requirements for UI eligibility among the four states. However, the Ohio shares of newly unemployed TANF leavers who apply for and receive UI benefits are lowest among the four states.
Using data from Georgia and Ohio I examined usage of Wagner-Peyser-funded public employment services, and the correlation between service receipt and measures of selfsufficiency. In these two states, public employment services are used by about one-quarter of newly jobless TANF leavers. Among TANF leaver UI applicants, more than 75 percent use public employment services whether they receive UI benefits or not, but only 14 percent of newly jobless TANF leavers who do not apply for UI choose to use public employment services.
So that application for UI appears to connect newly jobless TANF leavers with public employment services.
Welfare caseloads have declined dramatically since TANF was introduced in 1996. It is undeniable that TANF changed welfare as we knew it. Although caseloads have nearly vanished, need remains. Former TANF recipients and others vulnerable to welfare dependency are turning to multiple sources to replace cash public assistance. The roles of UI and ES services for lowincome Americans in a post-TANF economy should be better understood. This paper provides some of the first evidence on the degree to which this population is served under current arrangements. Employment policy is the new welfare policy. As additional work requirements are added to various parts of the social safety net, research should continue into the interaction between programs and the net benefits to household well being. 11,880 $8,239 $9,946 $7,640 $12,531 $7,260 $10,267 $6,766 $10,781 $7,462 $8,268 High qtr. earnings 8.7 7.7 8.4 7.4 9.3 7.8 9.3 7.9 8.7 7.6 7.9 a In Florida, age data are available at TANF exit. We construct age start with age as of UI BYB which is 33.3 years. Since the average length of time from TANF exit to new unemployment is 5.4 quarters for UI applicants (or 1.4 years), the average age at TANF exit is set at 31.9 years. b Because Florida uses Hispanic and non-Hispanic distinctions in its race categories (white non-Hispanic, white and Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, black and Hispanic, etc.) means are not strictly comparable to the other states. c Defined for both applicants and nonapplicants as the first four of the five quarters preceding the quarter of new unemployment.
